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This paper examines the brick kiln industry in Tamil Nadu as a case study to highlight the 
discrepancy between normative categories of decent work and workers’ experiences and subjectivities. 
It highlights the extreme vulnerability of circular migrants while stressing the diversity of circulation 
channels and how these are both shaped by and constitutive of distinct eco-type systems and village 
economies. The paper also shows how employers and labour recruiters exploit many different forms 
of agricultural decline, and how they influence and take advantage of workers’ constraints, 
expectations and aspirations. It is argued that debt bondage in the brick industry is supported by the 
decline in agricultural labour and lack of social protection but also partly by the growing 
consumption needs of labourers. Paradoxically, increasing aspirations for equality and integration are 












This paper takes the case study of Tamil Nadu’s brick kiln industry to highlight the 
discrepancy between normative categories of decent work and that of workers’ subjectivities, showing 
how employers use and take advantage of the diversity of workers’ lived experience. Industrial brick 
production is a typical form of neo-bondage (Breman 1996, 2007). Labourers become indebted to 
their employer via an advance that is contracted in the off-season in their place of origin. Combining 
wage advances, a piece rate system and postponed payment allows employers to attract a loyal, 
underpaid labour force while ensuring productivity. Debt bondage is the polar opposite of decent 
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work, forcing labourers to work for low or zero wages because they are struggling to repay a loan. 
Recent evidence suggests that debt bondage is a widespread form of forced labour, particularly in 
South Asia and above all in India (ILO 2009). While ‘old’ forms of agrestic bondage are fading away, 
new forms are emerging which often qualify as ‘neo-bondage’.1 In contrast to older forms of 
bondage, which were embedded into a wide set of rights and obligations and were often inter-
generational, neo-bondage is time-restricted and more economic in nature (Breman 1996). Neo-
bondage is present in a wide variety of seasonal work sites such as brick kilns, saltpans, stone quarries, 
construction sites (irrigation canals, dams, road building). It can also be found in the agro-business 
industry (e.g. sugarcane harvesting) as well as in rural or urban-based industries (mines, rice mills, 
small-scale carpet and weaving workshops, gem processing ateliers, bidi making, fish processing, silver 
work, salt plains, etc.) (Breman et al. 2009, Lerche 2007, Srivastava 2009). Neo-bondage is estimated 
to incorporate around 10 percent of the working population in the informal sector in India’s urban 
and rural economy, namely around 40 million (Breman 2011: 345, Heuzé 2009). It appears to 
originate from the combined effects of social hierarchies, chronic under-employment and specific 
modes of extraction of labour surplus (Breman 2007, Bremanet al. 2009, Lerche 2007, Srivastava 
2009). On the labour side, the decline of agricultural employment in many parts of rural India has 
created masses of poor people and a reserve army of both vulnerable and incredibly malleable labour. 
Agricultural labour has declined over the past few decades, whether through the adoption of capitalist 
technology and less labour-intensive production, or the severe crisis faced by small peasants 
(Ramachandran and Rawal 2011). The total share of agricultural work in rural labour was 77.7 
percent in 1983, in contrast to 66.5 percent in 2004-2005 (Srivastava, this volume). For capital, 
bondage can be a deliberate strategy to discipline and control seasonal labour (Breman 2007, Breman 
et al. 2009). But it may also help to attract and retain skilled workers, as in the case of weaving (De 
Neve 2005), diamond (Engelshoven 1999) or gem-cutting industries (Kapadia 1999). It can also be a 
way to block so-called self-employed workers’ free access to the market, as observed in coal mines 
(Heuzé 2009). Bondage as a labour management strategy evolves with technological change and/or 
market fluctuations. When markets stagnate or decline, the advance system may become less 
attractive (de Neve 2006) or even disappear (Engelshoven 1999). Conversely, when markets are 
booming, bonding labourers with debt can be a way to cope with the ‘labour problem’ (i.e. attracting 
and disciplining workers). This is especially true with brick kilns: given that there is continuous 
growth in a dynamic construction sector, migration and debt are increasingly strategically used by 
employers to attract and control labourers while maintaining very low wages. 
Labourers’ subjectivities, however, hardly fit with normative categories of labour standards 
and this is what the paper intends to explore. We are not the first to highlight the ambiguity of these 
contemporary forms of bondage. It is well-known, for instance, that where there are very high 
unemployment rates and sharp fluctuations in labour demand, workers may experience dependency 
on an employer or a recruiter as a safeguard and as job security. In the brick kilns, many workers do 
not experience advance payment as bondage, but as a strengthened bargaining position (Breman 
2007: 88; see also Guérin and Venkatasubramanian 2009). In a climate of violence and in the 
absence of formal institutions guaranteeing everyone's basic rights, dependency on an employer or 
recruiter might appear as a form of ‘protection’, as thin as it might be in practice (Heuzé 2009, 
Picherit 2009). Moreover, regardless of its conditions, migration might be considered a form of 
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emancipation where local social norms are oppressive. In a provocative essay on brick kiln migrants 
in Jharkhand, Shah (2006) for instance argues that far beyond economic motivations, and 
notwithstanding harsh working conditions, brick kiln migration is frequently experienced as a 
liberation from local oppression resulting from rising moral Puritanism in areas such as sexual 
lifestyles, food or domestic disputes.  
In the same vein, this article aims to highlight workers’ subjectivity and agency, considering 
their diversity and how they are constitutive of workers’ exploitation. Although all brick kiln 
migrants are bonded, poor and from the most marginalized community in Tamil Nadu (Paraiyar, ex-
untouchables), we argue that brick labour incorporates a wide range of strategies, perceptions and 
experiences. Labourers indicate in their narratives that they experience bonded migrancy either as a 
means to integrate and participate in the global economy, or as a sign that they are no longer in a 
position to work on the land. We argue that migration patterns and workers’ subjectivities are shaped 
by and constitutive of local production relations, within which agro-ecological conditions play a 
central role, in particular as regards the distinction between dry and irrigated zones. As various works 
on both past and present rural South India have pointed out, eco-type distinction pertains not only 
to matters of agricultural production but also to social stratification, shaping identities, the intensity 
of dependency ties and the extent to which caste and class overlap. 
Stressing migrants’ subjective feelings of upward mobility does not mean we should under-
estimate the violence of bonded labour. On the contrary, workers subject themselves to extremely 
bad working conditions not only because they have no other choice, but because of this feeling of 
relative upward mobility. In order to understand the current logics of capital, we need to examine 
not only how capital exploits labour, but also how capital accommodates, facilitates or blocks 
labourers’ aspirations for modernity. Our analysis shows how labour intermediaries and employers 
use a variety of strategies to discipline the workforce while taking advantage of distinct circulation 
channels, which in turn strengthens them.  
In short, the most inexperienced and vulnerable wetland workers suffer from the worst 
working conditions and are considered a flexible workforce to be used at peak production times. By 
contrast, dry land labourers, who have specialized in brick moulding for almost four decades, have 
learnt the tricks and techniques of this particular migration channel. They are considered a 
permanent and ‘reliable’ workforce and have stronger bargaining power, which they use to obtain 
slightly better working conditions. However they also use their position to obtain high advances, 
which feed their growing needs for consumerism, which arise from their migrant worker status. 
These advances mainly reinforce their own exploitation. As a result, as paradoxical as it might be, 
employment standards violations are not only compatible with rising aspirations for equality and 




Because of the strong growth in construction sector, Tamil Nadu is one of India’s most 
important brick making states (Prakash 2009). Our study focused on brick kilns in the Tiruvallur 
and Kancheepuram districts (north-east of Tamil Nadu), where a significant portion of the 
production is concentrated. We studied 10 hamlets located around 150 km south-east of production 
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sites in the Villupuram district (formerly South Arcot), where a significant part of the population 
migrate for brick kiln work every year. 
Our fieldwork began in 2003. Three of us spent intensive time in the villages between 2004 
and 2006 and then continued with regular visits until 2009, mainly in the villages but also at the 
workplaces. We focused on the lowest castes (Paraiyars, ex-untouchables) as they represent the bulk 
of the subaltern workforce in the brick industry. A large part of the research was qualitative and 
aimed at understanding both the functioning of the industry and the labourers’ experiences. The 
fieldwork concentrated on the workers, but we also held many interviews with recruiters, who as we 
shall later discuss play a decisive role, and with supervisors and employers. We also spent time 
studying the functioning of village life, which was quickly apparent plays a central role in the fabric 
of migration patterns. In order to quantify specific information such as living and working 
conditions, we also carried out a household survey. In 2004 we interviewed 198 households, which 
were randomly selected from two sets of dry and irrigated villages. 
Working conditions in the brick kilns are very poor. Wages are miserable (around 45 INR 
per day in 2004, that is around 1US$), working days are extremely long (twelve to sixteen hours, half 
of which are at night), and workers experience ongoing exposure not only to dust and heat, but to 
harassment from brick kiln supervisors, unsanitary conditions, etc. (Guérin and Venkatubramanian 
2009). Here our focus is labourer heterogeneity. To understand this we first used a Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA as a statistical technique allows the analysis of the 
relationship pattern of several categorical dependent variables. For a given sample of heterogeneous 
individuals MCA is usually used to build typologies, with the two main purposes of collating the 
most similar individuals, and then identifying the most important sources of similarities and 
dissimilarities. Given the multiplicity of interrelationships between variables, a regression-type 
analysis, aiming at quantifying causality, was not suitable. 
Our MCA was designed to classify households according to their socio-economic 
characteristics and place of residence  (Michiels 2009). In terms of the most important results, our 
analysis revealed two sets of differentiating factors: firstly place of origin (wet/irrigated), and secondly 
a number of socioeconomic and household demographic characteristics. Two distinct groups of 
workers emerged, the first consisting of households coming mostly from dry areas (92 percent). They 
are economically better off, more often owning a piece of land and concrete houses, more jewellery, 
and often not experiencing food insecurity.2 These households are bigger, older and less educated. 
Most are able to borrow outside the usual sources of pawnbrokers and landlords, and they more 
frequently combine brick kiln with agriculture on their own land for a living. The second group 
consists of households with the opposite characteristics. They mostly come from irrigated areas (98 
percent) and are economically more vulnerable, with fewer assets, no land, poor housing and many 
suffering from food insecurity. Very few borrow from outside the usual sources, this perhaps 
indicating that their social network is restricted. These households are also younger, smaller and 
slightly better educated at both primary and secondary level.  
Given that ecotype system distinctions emerged as a central factor, we then looked to focus 
on the reasons and meaning behind this distinction. Our analysis suggests that these two groups 
reflect distinct patterns of circular migration, which in turn are both shaped by and constitutive of 
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distinct village economies and forms of integration into the global economy. The next section 
explores the fabric of these differing circular migration patterns. 
 
 
The Fabric of Circular Migration Patterns 
Labourers’ agency is significantly affected by what they are likely to be offered in terms of 
employment, safety nets and protection by the villages of origin or workplaces. Given that the basic 
rights of labour exist on paper but are implemented mainly through personal bonds of allegiance and 
patronage, the poor seek out the most supportive – or least hostile – environments. As argued by 
Wood (2003), when the poor negotiate their own agency they have no choice but to arbitrate 
between the local moral economy, which is both protective and oppressive, and migration as a 
potentially liberating but extremely risky exit. This kind of dilemma certainly exists in Tamil Nadu, 
where agricultural employment has declined much more markedly than elsewhere in India, but at 
varying levels depending on the region and territory (NCEUS 2007). Local patronage has also 
eroded, but in a number of different ways. Village moral economy ethnographies indicate that 
patronage can decline, persist or take new forms,3 especially with the blossoming of public and 
private anti-poverty programs, for which local elites often act as intermediaries (Pattenden 2011; see 
also Picherit, this volume). Changes in agricultural labour and local patronage shape both the nature 
and intensity of circulation flows. In our case study, socioeconomic and political changes are closely 
associated with eco-type distinctions. These are not only a matter of production processes, technical 
constraints and crop type. Agro-climatic conditions are also constitutive of identities, social 
hierarchies and both spatial and social mobility circuits. Available literature indicates that drylands 
are more likely to have better landownership distribution, a greater dependence on outside and non 
farm labour – whether rural or urban – and lower caste interdependence.4 The low value of the land 
makes it more accessible, while job scarcity causes circulation. This in turn allows for the loosening of 
local ties of dependence and a broadening of horizons, expectations and aspirations, as pointed out 
for instance by Epstein (1973). To be free may simply mean freedom to starve (Breman 1996). What 
is certain however is that the physical character of the land is instrumental in the making and 
unmaking of local systems of rights and obligations. As we shall see here, it is also instrumental in 
forging varied degrees of rural/urban inter-linkages and in doing so in the shaping of labourers’ 
agency, the range of their constraints as well as their expectations and aspirations. 
While the district of Villupuram is one of Tamil Nadu’s most important agricultural 
producers, circular migration to both rural and urban destinations is widespread. As elsewhere in the 
state, the nature and the intensity of rural-urban linkages are highly diverse. Land quality and water 
availability, crop type, particularly in terms of labour intensiveness, proximity to transport 
infrastructures, social networks and individual circumstances all contribute to this. The Pennaiyar 
River crosses the district from west to east, from which many irrigation canals are derived. Nearby 
villages can produce two to three crops per year and enjoy both water and a rich alluvial soil. Moving 
away from the delta, the land becomes rocky, and the water table dries up. Farmers limit their 
production to one or possibly two crops a year, focusing on crops demanding little water such as 
groundnuts, black gram (lentils) and ragi (a millet). With the passing of the years, the gap has 
widened between those owning land and who managed to dig a well, and the others. Water resources 
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have significantly degraded: in the villages we studied, farmers say that they have to dig 250 feet to 
reach water, as opposed to 100 feet twenty years earlier. As a result, migration and circulation have 
steadily increased. Not all wet villages are necessarily agricultural however. Roadside villages notably 
have contributed to building rural-urban interlinkages. More recently the introduction of low-labour 
intensive crops such as fruit has tightened local labour markets, forcing the workers and especially the 
landless to move out. 
Circulation channels are both multiple and segmented.5 Villupuram district is no exception. 
Higher castes and classes are more likely to create businesses and to invest in profitable urban-based 
activities such as transport, construction or moneylending in nearby small and medium-sized towns 
such as Villupuram or Pondicherry. Those at the bottom of the hierarchy are more likely to enter 
into debt bondage relationships, most often as sugar cane harvest or brick kiln labourers. Meanwhile 
many activities hover between disguised wage work and self-employment, such as masonry work on 
construction sites and loading or unloading in markets. Circular migrants are mainly male, while 
debt bondage can involve whole families, as discussed later: women, the elderly and children are 
drafted in to raise productivity and to help pay back the advance. Migration channels are also shaped 
by individual circumstances where personal relationships are fundamental (Racine 1994). The 
emergence and evolution of migration channels to the brick kilns reflects these combined structural 
factors and individual circumstances. 
 
 
Brick Kiln Circular Migration From Dry Areas 
Large-scale brick kiln production on the outskirts of Chennai dates back to the mid 1970s. 
The massive expansion in production rapidly led to the use of migrant labour. Initially employers 
themselves went to the villages to recruit labourers. They focussed on dry villages which were already 
active in local traditional brick moulding.6 At the time there were only very small units of production 
in the countryside, which lasted only for the time of moulding and baking. Such production units, 
which are less common today, were often managed by the local middle castes (Vanniyars) while the 
workforce consisted of Paraiyars. Modern brick kilns managed to reproduce this labour hierarchy: 
Vanniyars were recruited as loaders and firemen, and then as labour intermediaries, while Paraiyars 
made up the bulk of the subordinate workforce as moulders. The advantages of employing the dry 
village labourers included that they were ready and available to leave their village for six to eight 
months per year, and desperate enough to accept very poor employment conditions. Employers were 
also looking for ‘reliable’ and ‘hard’ workers, which is where personal contacts came in. To control 
workers requires powerful networks in the source village. Villages whose workers were considered the 
most committed gradually gained a good reputation with employers, while others were discarded. 
Nowadays employers still discuss these matters and exchange information, drawing up black lists of 
places not to recruit from because workers from there are more rebellious than elsewhere, or because 
alliances with local leaders are more difficult. 
To return to the evolution of brick kiln worker circulation, workers considered the most 
reliable, primarily selected from the Vanniyars, have taken charge of recruiting and controlling 
labour, and distributing advances. What began as a marginal phenomenon gradually led to massive 
flows of seasonal migrants who travelled back and forth every year, dividing their time between the 
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brick kilns and their home place. Whole colonies of Paraiyars have gradually specialized in brick 
making. Nowadays brick kiln circulation sustains whole village economies. In the villages of our case 
study, around 90 percent of Paraiyar households work in the sector. Brick kiln circulation is both 
continuous and family-based. Most labourers bring other household members with them, with an 
average of three members. 80 percent have never stopped migrating, and it was once described to us 
as ‘our gold and our god’. The villages are thus deserted for part of the year. 
Initially the Paraiyars had little choice, as there was no local employment available. Over time 
they have managed to reap some benefits, and many of them today – 73 percent according to our 
survey – consider that their situation has improved over the past 25 years, although inequalities have 
increased as we shall see later. They insist on the hardness of the work, are perfectly aware of the 
extent of their exploitation. Mothers aspire to escape from the hell of the brick kilns when they 
discuss their daughters' weddings. Brick moulding is not seen as a something positive in itself, but 
rather as a source of progress as it allows the workers to escape from the oppressive realities in the 
home villages and enables changes to these realities (in line with Shah 2006).7 Labourers’ 
subjectivities should be viewed in the light of broader evolutions in village life. The construction 
industry boom has coincided with significant changes in land ownership and management in these 
villages. From the 1970s onward most upper castes – Reddiars, Naidus, Chettiars, Mudaliars – had 
begun to desert the area, selling all or part of their land and relocating to urban areas. Most still own 
a house in the area, but no longer live there. The Paraiyars who used to work for them were therefore 
forced to seek a new source of livelihood. Land transactions mostly benefited the middle caste 
Vanniyars, who today are the main landowners. As Béteille observed of another Tamil district 
(Béteille 1965), these changes have tended to loosen the grip of caste on many areas of social life. 
Attached labour for instance has totally disappeared after persisting until the 1980s, when it slowly 
started to fade with the departure of upper castes. The sense of independence is particularly evident 
when social and religious rituals are held, where gaining prestige and status depend upon the scale of 
the ceremony, the degree of ostentation, but also upon its mode of financing. Paraiyars traditionally 
used to rely on their landlords, but now manage a loan by borrowing considerable sums from 
multiple sources. During one of our field visits, Mayavel, a Paraiyar maistry (labour intermediary), 
showed us around the small temple that he had managed to build with his brothers, and the first 











Table 1.  Labourers from the drylands. Socioeconomic profile 
N = 103  
Concrete housing (% HH) 31.10% 
House size (% HH with more than 2 rooms) 14.60% 
Average size of the HH 5.35 
Illiteracy level (%HH) 57.70% 
Landowners (%HH) 52.42% 
Food insecurity (% HH) 19.42% 
Extended social networks (%HH) 67.90% 
Average total household income per year in INR 
(dispersion) 
30016  (15843) 
% Brick kiln income / total household income  75.6% 
Occupation other than brick kiln work  
Agricultural production 51.4% 
Agricultural coolie 41.1% 
Casual urban-based job 5.6% 
Permanent job 1.9% 
Total 100% 
Average outstanding debt in INR (dispersion) 25101 (17311) 
Ratio outstanding debt / total income 83.6% 





Although the Paraiyars are still at the bottom of their local social hierarchy, many still 
consider their situation better than that of their parents, often stating: ‘we have improved’. This 
highlights a general sense of an improved position within the local hierarchy, where they are no 
longer fully controlled by the upper castes and can even compete with the Vanniyars. Labourers are 
proud to say ‘we work outside’. The kind of work they do is not a concern – for most, it is brick kiln 
work but it could just as easily be anything else, as what counts is to feel independent.  
Such improvement proves highly unequal and ambiguous at the household level, however. 
Brick moulding has certainly prevented most, although not all workers, from starving. Today, 19 
percent still suffer from food insecurity. The average annual income is 30 016 INR, and most of 
them are still poor.8 However the ability to access cash, the desire to climb in the local hierarchy, and 
the success of a few is pushing most of the others to borrow large sums of money for consumer 
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expenditure and ostentatious purchases. This debt burden inevitably restricts possibilities for 
significant improvements. 
These hamlets’ brick kiln workers define themselves and are seen by others as people ‘who 
access money’. This means that they are both able to borrow money and to lend to others. Several 
interrelated factors contribute to this. Firstly, the wage advance of course is key. The advance 
represents a lump sum otherwise out of reach for Paraiyars. In 2004, the advance amount per 
household was on average 12,287 INR, which is 40 percent of the average annual household income. 
When the workers have good established relationships with their maistries and need bigger sums – 
for instance for marrying their children – they can negotiate several years’ worth of advance. 
Reciprocal exchanges with relatives are also frequent, where a household will take two years worth of 
advances and give up its turn the following year. With such arrangements, a single household can 
easily obtain 50,000 INR in one payment. Secondly, the very fact of being a brick kiln worker gives 
them to access to many other sources of funds, both in the village and the workplace. The advance 
serves as a form of guarantee, as payments to other lenders can be made from this and, in addition, 
maistries quite often act as official guarantors. Most households are thus highly indebted. The 
average outstanding debt per household was 25,101 INR, which represents 83.6 percent of the 
average annual income. The purposes for which the money is used also matter. According to our 
survey, 95 percent of the families spend part of the advance on daily survival (Table 2). But some 
manage to use it for a ‘good cause’, which can mean a variety of things. It can be firstly an investment 
in self-employment activities such as small businesses (7 percent of the households have used part of 
the advance for this purpose) or agriculture (34 percent). In both cases, profits are meagre and 
uncertain. In the case of agriculture, 50 percent of households are small producers. 71 percent earn 
an average of less than 5,000 Rs per year, and lose money in some years. Notwithstanding financial 
gains however, the very fact of being self-employed is highly valued. Running a petty business or 
cultivating one’s own land was something their parents barely knew of. Although this was not 



















Table 2.  Advance use (labourers from dry villages) 
 Dry areas 
Food 94.3% 
Health 21% 
Household items 14.3% 
Education 1.9% 
Marriage 8.6% 
Other ceremonies 12.4% 
Housing 2.9% 
Business investment 6.7% 
Agricultural investment 34.3% 





Social events and rituals are also considered a ‘good cause’. 20 percent of the households had 
spent part of their advance for this purpose. In these hamlets the cost of social and religious events 
has significantly increased over recent decades, to which the wage advance is likely to have 
contributed. While their own marriage barely cost a few thousand rupees, labourers now spend tens 
of thousands for their children’s: in 2004 the average amount spent was 32,000 INR. 28 percent of 
households had spent more than 50,000 INR. Detailed analysis of the funding of marriages 
highlights the fundamental role of wage advances. The events are experienced with ambivalence, as 
they are incontestably a source of dignity and social recognition, both for individuals, households and 
the whole community. Paraiyar brick kiln labourers are often proud to state that they use the same 
marriage halls as the Vanniyars. Many however complain about the burden of social pressure: we 
were often told spending big money had become a ‘duty’. People say that they spend much more 
than they can afford, because they are able to ‘access money’. There are frequent reports of brick kiln 
labourers trying to ‘follow the urban culture’, making their desires exceed their financial means. 
Last but not least, patterns of improvement are highly unequal. Around 15 percent of brick 
kiln workers in these hamlets are better off than the rest. They own concrete houses with two rooms, 
and earn over 40,000 INR per year. Most of the households own at least two acres of land and 
combine their surplus from the land with brick income. The best off work as maistries, of whom 
there are very few (4 percent in our sample). Many have tried to become maistries but very few have 
succeeded. As with any marginalized group social mobility process, the maistries attract both envy 
and jealousy. Feelings are all the more ambivalent given that the maistries to some extent reproduce 
the ambiguity of the hierarchical relations with their own caste fellows, in a mixture of protection 
and exploitation (Breman 1996, Guérin and Venkatasubramanian 2009, Picherit 2009). In the 
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villages studied here, the well-established maistries are all involved in politics, either through alliances 
or direct party representatives. Their role is also to help workers to take advantage of the few rights 
they have in the village. What is important for the purposes of the present analysis is the fact that 
they act as role models. For instance Mayavel, who managed to build a small temple, is often cited as 
an example. A few years earlier he was an ordinary labourer, who then managed to climb the social 
ladder. His story demonstrates to people that some sort of upward mobility is possible. Other 
workers often talk about him as a ‘big man’. There is no doubt that these few success stories lead to 
desires and aspirations. 
 
 
Brick Kiln Circulation From Wet Areas 
In the mid-1990s, brick kiln work also began to become a source of employment in certain 
irrigated areas, and in particular in those areas which had opted for less labour intensive crops, i.e., 
where villages had partially converted from paddy and sugar cane to guava and flowers. Many 
agricultural workers, and particularly men, were thus forced to seek a living outside the village. Brick 
kilns are one option among others, while sugarcane harvesting work in the south of the state is 
another frequent destination. The proportion of migrants is much lower than in dry areas. We 
estimate that around 20 to 30 percent of Paraiyar households are involved. Compared with dry areas, 
brick kiln migration is a more recent phenomenon. A quarter of the workers (23.4 percent) from wet 
zones began more than 10 years ago, while over half did from dry zones (55.7 percent) For many (67 
percent), it is a temporary option to which households resort when local agriculture labour is 
unavailable. It is also more often undertaken individually, and only 37.5 percent of the households 
bring their whole family, as opposed to 86.9 percent from dry areas. In many cases, brick production 
is not part of their livelihood portfolio; deciding for bricks depends upon specific circumstances: 
one’s own needs or the brick kiln industry employment demand.  
The wet hamlets in our case study are still typical of an agrarian economy, characterized by 
both the importance of agriculture and strong caste interdependence. In wet areas, the higher value of 
the land frequently makes it less accessible to the lowest castes. Here, Paraiyars have never owned 
land and nor do they today. This is particularly the case for those who migrate to the brick kilns. 
Most big landowners, all of whom are high caste, increasingly combine agricultural and non-
agricultural income, but they still cultivate land and live in the village. Over the past few decades 
agriculture has become increasingly capital intensive, especially for big farmers. This started in the 
1970s with the introduction of sugar cane. A new shift came in the mid-1990s with the introduction 
of less labour-intensive crops such as fruits. The ensuing shortage of labour demand accelerated the 
attached labour system’s disappearance, while circular migration became increasingly common. 
However the experience of circular migration, whether in terms of its social meaning or material 
conditions, differs sharply from the drylands. 
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Table 3.  Labourers from the wetlands. Socioeconomic profile 
N= 98  
Concrete housing (% HH) 4.20% 
House size (% HH with more than 2 rooms) 0.00% 
Average size of the HH 4.47 
Illiteracy levels 44.2% 
% of landowners 6.30% 
Food insecurity (% HH) 96.84% 
Extended social networks ((% HH who can borrow 
money outside usual sources) 
15% 
Average annual total household income 
(dispersion) 
16766 (2720) 
% brick kiln income / total household income 85.6% 
Agricultural production 1.9% 
Agricultural coolie 76.7% 
Casual urban-based job 21.4% 
Permanent job 0.0% 
 100% 
Average outstanding debt (dispersion) 6192 (4998) 
Ratio outstanding debt/ total income 35.9% 





In wet villages, agriculture is still considered a main occupation and as a primary aspiration. 
Working outside the village is most often viewed as a last resort and a way to make ends meet 
between two harvests, and it is only the most vulnerable who go. As indicated in Table 3, almost all 
of them suffer from food insecurity (96.84 percent), very few have concrete housing (4.2 percent) or 
land (6.4 percent). Their average annual incomes are far below decent living conditions (16,766 
INR), and most of it (85.6 percent) comes from brick labour. Most of the stories are similar: the 
workers leave to work in the brick kilns to pay off a debt due to marriage, death or illness. Here too 
contracting an advance before leaving for the chambers is a rule but amounts are lower than in dry 
lands (8,849 INR on average per household). In contrast to dry lands, the advance is almost 
exclusively used for emergency expenses. It is ‘like a cloud’, as the labourers often say. Investments, 
whether economic or non economic, are only exceptional (see Table 4). 
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Table 4.  Advance use (labourers from wetlands) 
 Irrigated areas 
Food 91.3% 
Health 18.3% 
Household items 38.5% 
Education 0 
Marriage 12.5% 
Other ceremonies 1.9% 
Housing 24% 
Business investment 0 
Agriculture investment 2.9% 





Labourers’ responses as to why they do not migrate more often are very clear: they define 
themselves as ‘peasants’ and often state: ‘we are born to the land and this is our land’. Even if most 
are landless, they are strongly attached to the village and agriculture. This might be a question of 
habit and identity or simply a lack of alternatives: some want to leave, but fail as they lack contacts 
with labour intermediaries.  
Staying in the village is also a matter of security. Brick kiln advances far exceed the amounts 
that workers can get locally, but being away from the village for around six months cuts them off 
from numerous local protection links. Labourers say that they lose ‘many sorts of help’ from the 
upper castes, which include the potential access to labour, loans, governmental schemes or NGOs. 
Conversely, upper castes are categorical that they do not provide ‘help’ or ‘recommendation’ for 
those who are unavailable for work. Although the upper caste landowners are not the masters they 
used to be, primarily because they fail to provide jobs, they still behave as benevolent patrons. Social 
and religious rituals illustrate this. In comparison to dry lands, rituals in wet areas are much less 
conspicuous – on average households spend three times less – and moreover they are still funded in 
large part by upper castes.  
 
 
Production Sites: Diversity of Workers and Forms of Exploitation  
Heterogeneous circulation patterns are both reflective and constitutive of differences in 
positions within the industry, degrees of bargaining power and thus differing working conditions. 
Workers’ capacity to resist exploitation is extremely limited. This is even more the case for migrants 
coming from wetlands. Incomes are lower: according to our survey in 2004, the average wage per 
head and per season was 5,863 INR for workers from the wetlands as opposed to 7,656 INR from 
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the drylands, namely 23 percent lower. Their working conditions and relationships are worse (see 
Table 5): child labour is more prevalent, housing conditions are poorer, workers have fewer days off, 
freedom of movement is highly limited, wage conditions are not transparent, and the workers 
complain more frequently of harassment and cheating problems. They are less frequently able to 
bargain, and those who try do so mainly as regards the advance, while workers from the dry zones 




Table 5.  Working conditions 
 Labourers from dry areas  Labourers from wetlands  
% of HH who use child labour 23.30% 53.70% 
% of HH who report no freedom 
to move from the workplace (to 
the market, cinema, meeting 




% of HH who report harassment 
problems  
43.70% 82% 
% of HH who feel cheated  
because wages are not disclosed 













% of HH who know the wage 83.50% 24.20% 
% of HH who bargain with 
maistries or employers 
 
for better wages 
for bigger advances  



















Various factors contribute to this. Dry zone households remain at the brick kilns for longer 
periods of time and thus produce more. Their growing season at the village is shorter, allowing them 
to depart by the end of December, while workers from the wetlands leave only in late January after 
the last harvest. As previously discussed, dry zone workers are more experienced. Insofar as 
employment conditions are extremely opaque and many issues are negotiated personally, this gives 
them a clear advantage. Their experience allows them to get better positions within the production 
hierarchy as loaders, bullock card drivers or maistries. As Table 6 shows, workers from drylands are 





Table 6.  Occupation within the brick kilns 
Worker Position 
within the industry dry irrigated 
Moulder 75.73% 96.84% 
Loader/unloader 11.65% 2.11% 
Bullock card driver 8.74% 0.00% 
Watchman 0.00% 1.05% 
Maistry 3.88% 0.00% 





To compare wages just for moulders, and taking into account a shorter working time, there is 
still a wage difference of 18 percent. Two main factors explain this difference: the workers’ industry 
know-how, and their bargaining power with the maistries. 
Labourers from dry villages have explored and worked in many – sometimes dozens – of 
places, and know their strengths and weaknesses. The biggest units are concentrated in the Red Hills 
area in suburban Chennai. They have not only large production capacities but also storage facilities. 
This allows them to enjoy much better market prices than chambers obliged to sell bricks 
immediately. They are located in towns, which facilitates travel and access to health care and 
sometimes education (through partnerships with NGOs). Many small units are then located further 
south in different parts of Kancheepuram district, well known for its sand quality. Production is 
often much lower and fluctuating, owing to competition and access to sand. While the Red Hills 
chambers are able to negotiate group licenses, this is not the case for the southern kilns. These units 
are far more notorious for poor working and living conditions, probably because of their geographical 
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isolation and higher productivity pressures (although this interrelationship needs to be investigated 
further). When they have the choice, workers try to avoid Kancheepuram chambers. 
Relationships with maistries are also clearly important. They recruit, distribute the advances, 
partly supervise the work, and settle the accounts at the end of the season. This comes at a cost: the 
maistries’ remuneration comes as a percentage of workers’ wages. The more the workers produce the 
better the maistries are paid, and the higher the piece rate, the more they can get. This is negotiated 
at the end of the season with the brick kiln supervisor, when all the accounts are settled. Workers are 
excluded from the negotiations. Then they are informed about their own accounts, but never the 
details of the calculations. This gives the maistries some freedom, but they also have to retain their 
workers’ loyalty, and for at least this part, the workers’ bargaining power is crucial. Here too, workers 
from the dry villages have an obvious advantage, as they know the maistries. In the villages we 
studied, all of the maistries without exception came from dry villages. The industry relies on the 
labourers from drylands to keep themselves in business, a point on which the maistries and employers 
are very clear: without the workers from dry areas, they cannot work. Recruiting and monitoring 
labourers from the wet areas is much more complicated, as they are so dispersed. Murali, who has 
been a maistry for around ten years, explained that in wet areas he needed to visit at least 10 villages 
to mobilize a batch of 20 labourers, while in dry areas one village is enough. The maistries have to 
ensure that workers will turn up on the departure day and that they won’t disappear before the end 
of the season. 
When labourers are dispersed spatially it is therefore much more challenging to control them. 
Other maistries complain about workers’ unreliability. Perumal, for instance, explains that ‘labourers 
from wet villages are not reliable. They only come when they need us. How can we manage the 
production? Good workers we can help. We give big advances, bonus. Bad workers, we can’t. They 
should understand our constraints’. 
Workers from wet zones have therefore limited choices. Even if they wished to specialize in 
brick kiln work, they could not. If they are not ‘reliable, very simply this is also because they cannot 
reliably expect work to be available. Brick kiln production is not only seasonal but also highly 
fluctuating, due to climactic factors – unexpected rain stops production – access to raw material and 
variations in the construction market. Some maistries clearly state that they only look for workers 
from wet areas at times of a production peak or when they are unable to offer the large advances 
demanded by workers from dry areas, as workers from wet areas are less demanding. For instance 
Rajendran, a young maistry, explained to us that last year ten workers escaped and he lost around 
100 000 rupees. This year he is bringing new labourers, but with lower advances. Though there are 
many labourers available in the area, he went to wet villages to enrol labourers. ‘Here they are asking 
for 20 000 rupees, he says, whereas there they only ask for 8000 rupees’.  
One might think that workers from the drylands profit from their relatively better situation 
to struggle as a group for better working conditions, but their slightly better conditions still fall far 
below decent labour standards, and there are no forms of collective action. Murali, a maistry, 
explained that the situation comes down to the following: 
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‘There is one [labour association] for the chamber owner. [For workers] there is no use for 
that, as the owners decide to pay high if the worker works fast. And less if they don’t work. 
And moreover the workers are varied and so we cannot form a group’.  
 
To the question of labour legislation, he replies: ‘we don’t follow any law. We just pay the advance 
from the employer, collect the workers and take them to the chamber, get the work done and then 
return to the place’.  
We met some workers who had subscribed to social insurance schemes, but they had all 
dropped them. Some were unable to renew their subscription, while others had failed to enforce their 
rights and were totally discouraged. The maistries represent the workers to the brick kilns supervisors 
and employers. When they have some room for manoeuvre, they use it mainly to negotiate their own 
commission. Meanwhile some of the workers, particularly the more experienced ones, try to discuss 
wages. However our data collected from the maistries reveal that while between 2000 and 2009 
wages significantly increased, advances increased much faster. One can therefore suspect that a 




Table 7.  Advances and wages from 2000 to 2009 (index price 2004) 









Advance  8743 10610 +21.35% 16214 +52.82% 
 
+74.17% 







During our last field visit in 2009, we met employers who had built partnerships with 
consumer goods companies providing motorcycles, fridges, grinders, etc. to the workers. Here too 
repayments are deducted from the wages. Our observations show that purchases on credit are 20 
percent more expensive than cash. The employers argue that this is a ‘boon’ for the workers, claiming 
that they offer ‘favours’ to ‘good’ workers, allowing them to save money. Murali, a maistry, gives us a 
different picture: 
 
‘There is not just the health problem, they cannot send their children to school, they cannot 
have animals in the house. If you visit the chamber we cannot find out who is who, they look 
not as humans. It is because they have to work more as they had taken an advance greater 
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than what they can repay. Sometimes the couples run off without repaying the money and we 
have to get the help of the police to get back the money’. 
 
It is likely that the employers’ strategy is above all a means to cope with the strong growth of 
the construction sector over the recent years. The brick industry has been backed by a vast housing 
scheme from the Tamil Nadu government and was unaffected by the global economic crisis, unlike 
the rest of the informal economy (Venkatesh 2009). The price of bricks has more than doubled over 
the past few years. To overcome labour shortages, employers increased wages but also and above all 
advances: as indicated in Table 7, real wages increased by 38 percent and advances increased much 




This microstudy sheds light on the diverse nature of brick kiln circulation experiences, how it 
is shaped by village life and the needs of capital, and how this leads to increasing differentiation of 
rural labour. Brick moulders come mainly from villages from dry areas. With agricultural decline and 
the departure of the big high-caste landowners, over time these villages have specialized in a specific, 
well-established migration circuit. Although working conditions violate the most basic labour 
standards, the brick kiln sector is seen by workers as a tool for integration into ‘modern’ life. It is also 
considered as a tool for emancipation from local hierarchies, although these disappeared a long time 
ago and no longer offer any prospect of employment or protection. In wet areas by contrast, where 
both agriculture and social stratification have evolved but still continue to play a more important 
role, brick kiln circular migration is both sporadic and unstructured. For this reason, it offers even 
worse working and living conditions, which only the most vulnerable accept – and some even cannot 
access kiln employment as they lack the right contacts. This leaves the village moral economy as a 
better option. 
One might ask why seasonal migrants persist in the brick industry, when other occupations 
and destinations in different parts of Tamil Nadu or South India offer far better working conditions. 
This is the case for instance in construction (see Pattenden in this volume) or in knitwear (Heyer in 
this volume). The advance is a first factor. The workers do not experience advance payment as 
bondage, but as a strengthening of their bargaining position (Breman 2007: 88; see also Guérin and 
Venkatasubramanian 2009). The great merit of the wage advance – and here lies the whole perversity 
of the system – is to act as a job guarantee. Until the debt is repaid, borrowers are forced to work, but 
they are also confident in having a job! The workers meanwhile need these lump sums to cope with 
the slack season, to deal with health problems and address their growing consumer needs. The social 
regulation of migration channels is the second factor (Harriss-White 2003, 2010; Harriss-White and 
Gooptu 2001). Although labour relations are outside all forms of legislation, they are highly 
structured, so that not just anyone can leave to take up work anywhere (see also Picherit, this 
volume). Employers need a productive, disciplined, loyal and cheap workforce. Debt is a means to 
attract and retain workers until the end of the season, and to compress wages. Personal links with 
both labourers, their neighbourhoods and the power structures of the source village, and labour 
intermediaries are a way to control workers and ensure they do not ‘escape’. Workers are thus 
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selected cautiously, and in turn, whatever the destination, workers rarely take the risk of leaving 
alone. Intermediaries are needed to find a place to live, an employer who is willing to recruit, and to 
withstand harsh competition from other workers. In the absence of formal regulation and labour 
contracts, personal relationships are the best way to limit the risks for both employers and workers. 
The contrast between these two cases might seem extreme. The opposition between dry and 
wetlands is both arbitrary and relative. We are not making a case for ecological determinism – the 
importance of other factors for circulation patterns has also been pointed out – but we want to 
emphasize the segmentation of one specific labour market and how this plays out both in terms of 
distinct village economies and the different needs and constraints of the brick industry. Brick labour 
markets consist of non-competing labourers whose options are not only severely constrained, but also 
highly diverse. Labourers are so isolated that they face different wage levels and working conditions, 
which is the very definition of segmentation in economic theory. This study has also highlighted the 
lived experience of circulation, and how it intersects with the significantly divergent testimonies of 
the labourers: brick moulding is either seen as a way to cope with agricultural distress, or as a means 
to integrate into society, not just as labourers but as consumers.  
As far as policy is concerned, one might wonder when and how Indian public authorities will 
have the political will to implement a decent labour agenda. Labour laws exist but have limited 
coverage and are poorly implemented (NCEUS 2009: 180). Far beyond bonded labour, brick kiln 
employers violate many other basic labour standards that are officially forbidden by the Indian 
legislation. This is the case in terms of child labour, working hours, provident funds, migrant labour 
and contract labour, to name but a few.9 Minimum wages exist and are almost met in the local kiln 
industry, but the amounts, which are fixed as a piece wage, are absolutely incompatible with decent 
daily wages. The absence of political will, administrative indifference and alliances between public 
authorities and employers all contribute to this (Breman 2007, Harriss-White 2003, Lerche 2007), 
and brick kilns of Tamil Nadu are no exception (Guérin and Venkatasubramanian 2009). 
While significant progress has been made in recent years as regards social security in relation 
to informal labour programmes, here too implementation is a source of concern (Harriss-White 
2011, Hensman 2011). In Tamil Nadu, which is considered as one of the pioneer states in adopting 
specific measures for the unorganised sector, a Construction Workers Welfare Board has existed since 
1994. Workers are officially eligible to various sorts of benefits, ranging from compensation in the 
case of accidents to educational assistance (Government of Tamil Nadu 2010). At the time of our last 
field visit in June 2009, it seems that none of these had reached the brick kiln workers, at least in the 
source village we studied. Regulation meanwhile is still off the agenda (see Lerche, this volume). Here 
we see how the anti-poverty programs, of which Tamil Nadu is a champion, obscure the structural 
reforms that are needed for a social democratic transformation of the society (Harriss 2010).  
It would however be naïve to hope that employers themselves will stop these inhumane forms 
of labour management. Debt bondage in the brick industry is supported by the decline in the 
availability of agricultural labour and lack of social protection but also by the growing consumption 
needs of labourers. Paradoxically, increasing aspirations for equality and integration are helping to 
reproduce the conditions for capitalist exploitation and extraction of surplus value. Without massive 





1.  See for instance da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999), Harriss (1992), Jodhka (1994), Lerche 
(1999), Marius-Gnanou (2008).  
 
2.  Food insecurity is defined subjectively; labourers themselves were asked to reply to the question 
‘do you suffer from food insecurity’? 
 
3.  For a case study in Tamil Nadu, see Harriss et al. (2010). For a review, see Platteau (1995). 
 
4.  For a historical analysis, see Ludden (2005). For contemporary analysis, see for instance Bouton 
(1985), Chambers and Harriss (1977), Djurfeldt et al. (2008), Epstein (1973), Epstein et al. (2002), 
Landy (1994), Racine (1994), Ramachandran and Rawal (2010), Venkatesh et al. (1986). 
 
5.  See for instance Breman (1996), Harriss (1992), Harriss-White (2003), Lerche (2010), Srivastava 
(2005), Racine (1994).  
 
6.  These are very small and temporary production units. 
 
7.  Drawing on brick kiln migrants in Jharkhand, Alpa Shah argues that far beyond economic 
motivations, migration to brick kilns is very often seen and experienced in terms of liberation from 
an oppressive local environment of growing moral puritanism, whether sexual life, food or domestic 
disputes. This is not the case here, as workers already enjoy relative freedom at home. What we 
observe here is a feeling of emancipation and integration drawing on outside work and consumption. 
 
8.  In 2004-5, the Planning Commission of India fixed the poverty line at around 20 000 INR per 
household for rural Tamil Nadu. This amount is clearly under-evaluated (Subramanian 2011). 
 
9.  Prohibition of Child Labour in Hazardous Industries Act (1970); Employment Provident Fund 
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (1971); Factory Act (1948), which regulates working hours and 
provides compensation for overtime; Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act (1979) which provides for 
specific measures (housing, medical coverage, etc.) when more than 50 percent of a company's work 
force are migrants; Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which aims at limiting 
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